B Coy 4 Scots (The Highlanders) sent this report from Afghanistan. Click on the pictures for full sized ones.
B Company, 4th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland
Operation Herrick 7/8 – The First Six Weeks
It has been an action packed first 6 weeks or so for the Bonnie B Company on Operation Herrick 7/8. We deployed in mid-February to take over from Right Flank Company as the ‘independent’ Armoured Infantry Company Group in Afghanistan. In fact we are currently the only AI Company Group and we have been assigned under operational command of the Battlegroup in the North West of Helmand Province, responsible for the area of Musa Qal’eh and Now Zad.
Our arrival into theatre was made all the smoother by an excellent hand-over from the Scots Guards, who not only passed on the fleet of 26 Warrior Armoured Fighting Vehicles in great ‘nick’ but also ran a superb and very realistic integration training package out on the ranges. The opportunity for all members of B Company to get alongside their counterparts to share in their experience of the previous six months was invaluable. We learnt more about the environment that would be facing and the capabilities as well as the limitations of our enemy. The training package culminated in the Platoons taking turns to conduct a live firing compound clearance with Warrior firing in intimate support. The Company Commander of Right Flank Company was at pains to ensure that the jocks were given a realistic assessment of the enemy that they would be facing and not to overestimate them. As a result the company finished the training package brimming with confidence and ready to face the challenges ahead.
After detailed orders and a rock drill held in the beating sun out in the tank park, we were finally ready for deployment. The move started at in the early morning with the column halting after a couple of kilometres to test fire all weapons systems before continuing onto Highway 1 towards Garesk. Our first experience of Afghanistan traffic was interesting to say the least as we passed a fully laden coach with two cars ‘bungeed’ to the roof. Soon we left the road and started to make our way North across the rolling desert. Stopping for a break at lunchtime we threw a track in the deep sand and the ensuing delay meant that it was not possible to reach our destination before last light, so we were forced to occupy a hasty leaguer and complete our journey on the following morning.
Forward Operating Base Edinburgh sits on the high ground, overlooking Musa Qal’eh to its East near a legacy minefield from the days of the Soviet occupation. We were ushered into the ubiquitous ‘Hesco-Bastion’ compound by staff from the Household Cavalry Battlegroup and given a full situation brief. The Battlegroup Chief of Staff described the ‘elastic’ forward line of enemy troops running between the relatively benign village of Shar Keriz, home of Mullah Salam the newly elected District Governor and the notorious village of Keriz-deh-Babah (aka KDB) only 5 kilometres further to the West which is known as a hotbed of enemy activity. We met up with C Squadron, with whom we would form Combat Team East, responsible for the area to the East of Musa Qal’eh known as Zamindavar. Amongst their number was none other than Prince Harry who was their Forward Air Controller before his premature withdrawal from theatre as a result of his exposure by the press. We were very fortunate to be given the opportunity to ‘bed in’ with another sub-unit with an intimate knowledge of the local area. Especially useful was the instruction received from Corporal Smith, C Squadron’s attached Royal Engineer specialist who took us through the drills for searching an area for mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). During their tour C Squadron had found no fewer than 14 such devices – we were all ears.***
We set off early the following morning to head down the hill along Route Ellen, past various observation posts and Afghan National Army (ANA) patrol bases and forded the river by Musa Qal’eh District Centre. This is the same building occupied by 3 PARA back in the summer of 2006, now much more heavily fortified and home to the Tactical Headquarters of Battlegroup North West. There we met the Commanding Officer, who described his intent for ongoing security operations and a plan for Mullah Salam to conduct an outreach ‘Shura’ or meeting with village elders in KDB. With this in mind we headed on up the Landay Nawah wadi and broke out into the desert where we chose a suitable spot and moved into our desert leaguer formation for the night. Over the next few days we familiarised ourselves with the area, our first set piece op being to conduct a clearance of the village of Juy Duraz. As we approached the Star Wars like buildings from the North there was a flurry of activity as 8 motorbikes left at high speed towards the South West. Were they Taliban? The locals that we spoke to assured us that they were not. The Taliban did occasionally come to their village, but they had not been seen for several months. It would be easy to understand why locals could be intimidated by a large number of armoured vehicles closing in. However this line of questioning would be one that would often be repeated over the coming weeks.
The operation to secure KDB for the Shura started before first light. Using his newfound mine detection skills, Lance Corporal Naughton from 6 Platoon, attached from the Territorial Army 7 SCOTS, was the first to find an IED. A pressure pad device than had been emplaced to attack a vehicle moving into an overwatch position on the outskirts of the village. The investment and subsequent occupation of the village went like clockwork. Very soon members of 5 Platoon had secured the proposed venue for the Shura, a disused Madrassa on the edge of the town square, whilst 7 Platoon were conducting a reassurance patrol on foot through the village. Very quickly, as the jocks did what they do best and started to engage with the locals, people started to come back in from the fields and the shops in the Bazaar started to open for business. After a tense night wondering if the enemy would try their luck, a similar patrol on the following morning led to the assessment that conditions were suitable for the Shura to go ahead. Accordingly 6 Platoon were dispatched to the DC to escort the District Governor and the CO. With a little gentle encouragement from the Afghan National Police, who rounded up the locals, very soon 240 males of all ages were listening intently to a long monologue by Mullah Salam. I must admit that this was not exactly what I had imagined, but as the sacks of rice, blankets and pots and pans were handed out everyone seemed to be quite content as they left, laden down with goodies. Meanwhile the Police Mentoring Team had done some good work in following some potential leads from locals who had approached us over the previous days offering information. Rather than leave the village immediately, we decided to spend a further night there before withdrawing on the following morning. In hindsight it is extraordinary to think that all this was achieved without a shot being fired other than some artillery smoke rounds, used as a show of force to deter a possible enemy observation post on a hill to the South West of KDB – which was to become known as ‘OP Hill’. As you will see when we returned later KDB was to live up to its reputation.
Our next planned operation was to conduct a patrol into a village to the South East of KDB, near the prominent land mark of the Zar Shur ruins. This ancient fort consists of a 400 metre square compound with battlements and 10 metre high towers on each corner and a large earth mound in the centre. This was to make an impressive back drop to the events that followed. Our day started with a delegation of four elders from the nearby village of Shagsay approaching our desert leaguer to kindly request that we should not attack their village. They reported that a group of three Taliban had come to the village on the previous evening attempting to set up mortar base plate from which to attack us, but that the village elders had driven them away, knowing that any Taliban attack was likely to lead to retaliation. During a previous operation in the area 24 of their villagers had been killed and clearly they were keen not to see a repeat of this. We offered them a cup of tea - ‘Pineapple and Mango’ flavour from the Company Second-in-Command’s personal supply was all that came to hand. The elders politely declined a second cup and went on their way.
1100hours marked H-Hour. Our plan was to approach the village from the West with 6 Platoon leading and to dismount and patrol through the village, reassuring the locals as we went in much the same way that we had done in Juy Duraz or KDB on the previous days. The enemy had other ideas and as we crested the hill the Company Commander’s vehicle, callsign Zero Bravo was the first to sight a vertical puff of smoke. This was the tell-tale sign of an enemy mortar base plate attempting to engage us from the centre of the village. Zero Bravo immediately returned fire to bring the other callsigns on and suppressive fire was applied by 6 Platoon while 5 Platoon Warriors moved left flanking to negotiate a fairly narrow but impassable wadi which ran from North to South across our frontage. What followed was a text book compound clearance drill by 5 Platoon’s dismounts who advanced across the open ground under fire and carried out a clearance of a number of compounds, several of which were still occupied by locals who were cowering in fear. Fortunately we had resisted the temptation to call for indirect fire or else there could have been collateral damage. As they did so a second group of enemy appeared on the South Western corner of the village and engaged us with Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) and small arms fire. Once 5 Platoon had secured the initial firing point it was decided to push 6 Platoon through to clear the South Western sector of the village. They used the Warrior to best effect, blasting open a bricked up doorway and pushing down a mud wall to provide access. As 6 Platoon assaulted forward they came into contact with and destroyed one of the enemy snipers who had engaged us. Seeing that we had the upper hand, the enemy now retreated down a rat run in a Wadi bed towards the village of Shagsay. As the battle swung south, 5 Platoon were ordered to go firm, while 6 Platoon provided fire support for 7 Platoon’s follow up. In the process a number of enemy were despatched by some excellent gunnery. As the battle drew to a close the village head or Malik from Shagsay came to the outskirts of the village. Lieutenant Havelock was sent forward to apologise for the damage and for the quality of the 2IC’s tea! As the company withdrew to its night time location we again came under attack from indirect fire, probably 82 mm mortars. Some aggressive gunnery, this time by 7 Platoon allowed the company to break clean albeit with a ‘hairy’ moment or two for Zero Charlie, as the Company 2IC stood on top of his vehicle to dismount his 8 metre mast whilst under fire!
***
The next morning saw 6 Platoon mount a reassurance patrol back into KDB to assess atmospherics in the wake of the Shura. Locals had expressed their concern that the Taliban would be back and urged the need for a permanent security presence in the village. Alas, ANA and ANP resources are too thinly stretched and it is not appropriate to use manoeuvre sub-unit to conduct static framework tasks. Sure enough, as 6 Platoon approached the Eastern outskirts of the village they came under ambush by a heavy weight of small arms fire from the area of the graveyard. This was where the drills kicked in and as we heard the Platoon Commander and Sergeant coordinating the withdrawal in contact 5 Platoon was despatched as a Quick Reaction Force, closely followed by the remainder of the company.
Once 6 Platoon were safely back under armour it was decided to approach the village from a different direction to disrupt what was assessed to be a relatively small and lightly armed enemy. In the process of moving around to the South enemy were seen on the top of OP Hill and the company came under attack from indirect fire from the area of Pirzay Chahah Bar, some 3 or 4 kilometres south of KDB. There was no doubt that the observers on the top of OP Hill were not out for a Sunday afternoon picnic. Opal 66 our attached Fire Support Team called in an A10 Warthog ground attack aircraft to attack the OP with devastating effect, after which 7 Platoon without becoming over extended, were able to successfully clear enemy from the southern part of the village.
***
Our next task was to be a Battlegroup advance to contact from South to North up the Musa Qal’eh Wadi. Whilst the town of Sangin on the Helmand River to the South and Musa Qal’eh to the North have been secured, the ‘meat in the sandwich’ along the wadi had never been subject to a systematic clearance operation. The rationale for conducting the operation was to disrupt the enemy sufficiently to allow an operational pause while the Battlegroup conducted its handover over the coming weeks. B Company Group was to be the forward left company, with a Company of ANP in support on the BG Main Effort.
It would be fair to say that the operation did not get off to the best start. To begin with it proved difficult to locate an overnight leaguer and the occupation of the location chosen, out of sight down in a wadi was made more difficult by the need to accommodate the HCR Battlegroup Tactical Headquarters and a number of attached ANP callsigns, who were something of a law unto themselves. On arrival in the leaguer they immediately announced that they needed to fetch water. It was made absolutely clear to them that they should return promptly and not wander around after last light, otherwise they were likely to be shot. As we vacated the leaguer at first light it was a CVR(T) callsign that threw a track initially causing a delay. (H-Hour is normally determined by the time that the artillery assets are available, so it was rather ironic that it was the Battery Commander’s vehicle). The problem sorted we made it down the wadi and onto the line of departure in good order, albeit a few minutes late. However a few minutes after beginning our advance, one of the 6 Platoon Warriors, Callsign ‘21’ was struck by an IED. Thankfully the crew, whilst slightly dazed, were uninjured, although the bar armour had been blown approximately 200 metres by the blast and there was substantial damage to the running gear. The CO was keen to continue the advance in order to maintain the initiative and acknowledging the risk that the belly plate was likely to be damaged beyond repair, gave the order that the Warrior was to be dragged into the wadi behind Battlegroup Tactical Headquarters. In the event this proved impossible to achieve. Even with two recovery vehicles towing the vehicle was too heavy and dug into the ground. Lesson Identified – Never try to drag a Warrior until you have repaired its running gear! Meanwhile the advance to contact continued. Under Rule of Engagement 421 and 422 the parameters for attacking the enemy were relaxed slightly. Instead of the usual ‘Card A’ rules for self-defence under 421/422 it is permitted to engage an enemy where it is believed that an attack is imminent. Having already been engaged by RPG fire, we did just that when an individual was clearly seen to be speaking into a device with an antenna fitted. By this time we were in contact and all civilians had made themselves scarce. He was clearly a ‘dicker’ and he paid for his mistake. His radio transmitter was recovered in the follow up action and we were able to tune in the intercom (or iCOM) scanners carried by our interpreters to the enemy’s frequency of the day.
As we advanced it became clear that while going was relatively good for Warrior on the high open ground to the West, the closer country adjacent to the wadi itself was better suited to dismounted action. The Police Chief, Commander Koka and his ANP were keen to conduct a dismounted clearance of the village and accordingly a plan was hatched for the ‘Kokanuts’ and their attached Police Mentoring Team to do just that. Since the PMT only had a dismounted High Frequency radio set communications were difficult from the outset. Therefore it was decided that a clearly delineated feature of the main road would be used as the inter sub-unit boundary and a Warrior would move, with hatches battened down, along the road to mark the forward line of own troops. In the event of a casualty the PMT were to bring the casualty to the road to marry up with the medic and a Warrior for onward movement to the HLS. The initial advance to contact went without a hitch. When 5 Platoon came under heavy and repeated RPG fire on the outskirts of the village of Regay, and a heavy weight of 30mm fire failed to do the trick, a fire mission from 105mm light guns was used, and rounds crept towards the enemy firing points on the edge of the village. This was enough to silence the enemy for now. As last light started to fall a miracle happened, callsign ‘21’ seemingly out of the game for good only a few hours before was seen tracking forward under its own steam, only slightly the worse for wear. Lesson: ‘Look after your Fitter Section’. The next challenge was to move the platoons, one at a time to a refuelling point some 5 kilometres to the West in the dark. Despite marking the route with infra red cyalumes, (invisible to the naked eye but seen through night sights), it was inevitable that one or two callsigns got bogged in causing a sleepless night.
The following morning saw a Warrior used to create a ‘mousehole’ in a compound wall to allow the Kokanuts to continue their advance, with a smoke mission to cover their advance across the open ground. At 0754 a message was received from the PMT stating that they had suffered a casualty, but apart from a sighting of a smoke grenade thrown somewhere in the green zone some 350 metres away from the nearest Warrior no further information was forthcoming. The company immediately swung into action to attempt to assist the casualty and 5 Platoon Warrior Sergeant threw his own smoke, to allow PMT callsigns to begin their casualty extraction. The situation became very tense as everyone sought to move into a position where they could assist. By 0812 the situation was still very confused, with still no information about the casualty or the enemy. 5 Platoon had by now dismounted and were ordered to advance into the green zone towards the area of the casualty. The Platoon Commander was told that he may need to fight his way in. A few minutes later at 0818 a further message was received from Battlegroup, stating that the enemy was present in platoon strength and that we were to launch a company dismounted attack to extract the casualty. 5 Platoon was recalled and 7 Platoon has to be pulled back from their positions screening 500 metres further to the north, thereby imposing further delay. At 0837 a grid reference for the casualty was received and 5 Platoon launched down a steep slope into very thick and complex terrain. By 0844 they had reached the casualty, a British soldier who had sustained a gunshot wound to his back. It took most of 5 Platoon to carry him on a lightweight stretcher to Callsign ‘12’, 5 Platoon Warrior Sergeant who had moved to a new pick-up point further to the north as it was impossible to exit where they had gone in. By forcing our way up a narrow street, lined by police 4x4’s towards the helicopter landing site we were able to get the casualty on board the Chinook, which took off at 0906 hours. The casualty incident was a sobering reminder for the company of what could happen and a telling lesson of ‘No Casualty Evacuation Plan Survives Contact’.
Having listened to an Apache attack helicopter sight a group of five armed enemy in a pick up truck and then engage with hellfire missile, we drove on with the advance to contact by launching a two up assault onto some suspected enemy compounds. In the event the rapid manoeuvre was somewhat less spectacular than planned as the objectives lay in amongst heavily irrigated poppy fields meaning that the Warrior slowed almost to a standstill as they churned along up to their bellies in mud. In the event there were no enemy in the compounds, but Commander Koka was able to confirm that a local enemy commander had been destroyed by the Apache earlier in the day. Perhaps his colleagues had taken the hint? On completion of the operation at the village of Sharagey, the company group moved into the wadi and headed north as the sun was setting
Intelligence reports of large numbers of enemy on motorbikes moving back into Sharagey coincided with the requirement to go to the aid of an ANA callsign, whose Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team had been engaged by RPG striking their Vector armoured vehicle and causing two casualties. Callsign Zero Charlie quickly moved to the scene and effected the casualty evacuation, which was complicated by a number of thrown tracks and bogged vehicles. Eventually the burning vehicle having been destroyed by Hellfire missile, the company was released to conduct its subsequent task. This time the company was despatched part way down the wadi to the south again with the Kokanuts in support. The plan was to conduct an advance to contact back towards the ANA patrol bases on the southern part of Musa Qal’eh. As we moved down the wadi we came under small arms and RPG engagement. At least one RPG gunner and a dicker were destroyed. The following day proved tough going for the Warriors as they battled their way through very close country, but all was quiet and no further enemy were encountered. This reflected an earlier pattern whereby enemy were overmatched on the first day, and thereafter tended to thin out, perhaps deterred by their previous encounter?
In the early hours of the morning information was received relating to a number of enemy who were suspected to have occupied a compound near to the contact point of the ill feted Vector of the previous days. A hasty plan was drawn up for a night time move up the wadi, on headlights to avoid the risk of bogging. As we approached the objective the target would be marked by C Squadron. At dawn we would launch in to secure the objective to allow the ANA to move in an effect any arrests. The operation ran smoothly. 7 Platoon secured the objective and a total of four fighting aged males were initially detained, of whom at least one was later found to be a Taliban commander.
By now the heavy going and especially the shingle in the wadis, was beginning to take its toll on the Warriors. In particular a large number of rear idler wheels needed to be replaced urgently or risk catastrophic failure of the entire running gear. Over the next few days a half company group at a time was rotated through Forward Operating Base Edinburgh, to conduct vehicle maintenance. Meanwhile, given the perceived threat to Musa Qal’eh from the east, the company was directed to continue to provide a patrol presence to the east of Musa Qal’eh, while C Squadron returned to Camp Bastion to undertake a consolidated equipment care period.
***
Whilst it was known that Mullah Salam maintained a detachment of militia near his home at Keriz-e-Bahador, near Shar Keriz not very much more was known about them. So it was with a degree of curiosity that we approached the village on a fact finding mission. Our delegation was met with open arms and the commander, Gulam Mohammed Khan graciously invited us to share green tea, as he described his predicament. He assumed the role of commander when his brother, Nik Mohammed was killed by an IED, apparently planted by a key Taliban commander currently at large in Pirzay-Chahar-Bar. He has approximately 50 men, organised into 5 sections, of whom at any one time a dozen guard Mullah Salaam’s house, while the remainder appear to loaf around in a large police compound which has been commandeered from a local drug dealer. They have five police 4x4 trucks of which two are broken down and a white Toyota Corolla estate which appears to have been stolen and a motorbike. Some of them have uniform, others have a weapon and they claim not to have been paid for the better part of four months. And this is what passes for the face of the Afghan authorities in this part of the world! Clearly something needed to be done. We started by suggesting a small joint patrol through the village, being careful to ensure that they went in front so that none of their weapons were pointing at us! The patrol went well and when we returned two days later we were greeted with open arms. Since then we have conducted a series of patrols and identified a possible opportunity to use the large police compound as a fire base for the 105mm gun troop. This would serve the purpose of providing overt support to Mullah Salam as well as a deterrent or immediate response for the militia when they come under attack by the Taliban, as they say they do on a twice weekly basis. However, no matter how enthusiastic they are, any progress would appear to be reliant on the militia being placed on some officially recognised footing[1].
***
Crossing the elastic forward line of own troops is always a risky business. On this occasion we decided to approach KDB as a half company group from the west with 5 platoon leading, Company Tactical Headquarters and 6 Platoon in echelon. We are fortunate that Company Tac consists of three fighting callsigns, ‘Zero Bravo’, ‘33A’ – the Company Sergeant Major’s vehicle and ‘24’ the Artificer or ‘Tiffy’ for short who commands our Fitter Section. Predictably were soon under contact as we moved down a prominent wadi to the west of KDB. As we made our way towards higher ground near OP Hill we came under contact from 107mm rockets and returned fire against the enemy, causing them to withdraw southwards. Orders were given to attempt to outflank the enemy by a bold right hook, but the terrain dictated otherwise and 5 Platoon soon found themselves with a vehicle bogged in under heavy contact from the eastern side of the wadi. With fire sweeping across the open ground the Lieutenant Robertson gave the order for his dismounts to get inside the vehicle. Meanwhile the commander of his attached Fitter Section callsign, Corporal Terry got out and started to dig. He was soon joined by Staff Sergeant Guthrie and over the course of the next 30 minutes or so, as the enemy attempted to envelop to the west and under constant attack from the enemy less than 125 metres away, they took turns to dig, occasionally picking up their rifles to return fire. By throwing items of equipment under the tracks they were gradually able to make progress and the vehicle was able to start inching towards the edge of the field. Meanwhile the Fire Support Team cued up a strike by a French Mirage, that was able to drop a 500lb bomb with pinpoint accuracy at the entrance to a rat run that the enemy were using to move towards the firing point. This allowed the callsigns to break clean.
On the following day the half company group moved around to the South of Pirzay Chahar Bar and the site of the previous day’s action. As we crossed a defile we began to see the tell-tale signs of enemy preparing to attack and a sweep stake was started as to the time of the first round fired. Eventually as we passed the village of Talaregh we came under contact from RPG but did not return fire, the contact point being a mosque. The second contact point was not a mosque but an enemy in a white pick-up truck. 105mm airburst was used, with a faster response time than air and in order to minimise collateral damage. Later that day we returned to Shagsay and paid a visit to the Mullah, handing out small gifts of humanitarian aid and a copy of the Koran for his Mosque. Our extraction was slower than planned as a few of the locals saw an opportunity for a handout and moved in. Fortunately a volley of RPG fire flew wide and we were able to leave in reasonably good order to complete our future tasks.
***
The arrival of 5 SCOTS Battlegroup saw a distinct change of tone. Patrols would be of more limited duration and orientated North to South astride the Musa Qal’eh wadi as opposed to east west as hitherto. The aim would be for more specific tasking of patrols with a focus on gathering low level intelligence and improving situational awareness.
With this in mind the company set off for its final four day tasking prior to moving back to Camp Bastion to conduct a major overhaul of a Warrior fleet that was by now starting to creak quite badly. Our first port of call was the police station at Keriz-e-Bahador. This time our aim was to assess the layout of Mullah Salam’s compound and the state of the fleet of police cars that would appear to be falling into a state of disrepair. During the meeting Mullah Salam himself called and spoke to my interpreter, obviously keen to know what we were up to. Task complete on the following day we moved back to Juy Duraz, site of our first clearance operation. The place was totally deserted, the nomadic inhabitants having moved to higher pastures further up the mountain. Perhaps this confirmed our suspicion that the random motorcyclists from our previous patrol were in fact Taliban after all? We followed in the route of the nomads up the valley towards the village of Rowshanabad, also fairly deserted but our visit there coincided with a large amount of traffic returning from the bazaar towards the mountain pass laden with goods. We took the opportunity to mount a vehicle check point, only to discover that the Taliban already had the same and idea. Depending on whom you believe the check point had been in existence that morning or had not been in place for three months, but one customer had been careful to keep his receipt, issued by the Taliban in order to avoid the need to pay a second time on the return leg. In the course of our checks, one of the occupants of one vehicle blurted out something in English, but then refused to acknowledge that he spoke or understood the language. Lieutenant Havelock then removed his watch and loudly asked if anyone had the time, at which point all three men in the back of the car involuntarily looked down at their wrists[2].
Moving out of our leaguer early on the morning of 1 April 2008, we conducted a defile drill to occupy the wadi well to the north of Musa Qal’eh. This was uncharted territory for us, but there is no doubt that at this point the wadi lives up to its reputation as being akin to the ‘grand canyon’. As we reached the wadi bottom at approximately 1200 hours, we received orders to move further south than previously planned. Wasak Keli is a suburb on the northern outskirts of Musa Qual’eh where there had been reports of up to 15 foreign fighters intimidating the local population. Our initial task was to provide support to a dismounted ANA patrol as they cleared through the village. As we moved down the wadi a couple of vehicles suffered problems with running gear. Given the vulnerable nature of the dismounted ANA patrol and their associated OMLT and our previous experience in Regay, with the PMT casualty it was decided to leave a half company group under command of ‘Zero Charlie’, while the Company Tac HQ, 5 and 7 Platoons moved south to support the ANA patrol. Zero Charlie half company included the Immediate Replenishment Group of three DROPS trucks carrying supplies and a 20,000 litre fuel tanker protected by 6 Platoon.
Seeing us doing this, it is assessed that the enemy must have hastily activated a number of previously laid IEDs. The plan had been for Zero Charlie half company group to stop short about 5 kilometres further up the wadi, but as they moved south callsign ‘24’ was struck by an IED with no casualties. As we started to come under increasingly heavy attack, it became clear that it would be necessary to immediately escort our support vehicles away from the contact point to the relative safety of the Musa Qual’eh DC. Callsign ‘32’ was driving forward to do this when it was struck by a second larger IED. The explosion caused severe damage to the vehicle resulting in the engine being forced out through the engine decks. The commander, Corporal Wayne Forbes suffered a dislocated elbow and the driver Highlander Stephen Denoon suffered a compressed spine. A few minutes later, as Cpl Corrie Garrow commanding callsign ‘31’ continued to escort the fuel tanker and the other trucks towards the DC, a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) exploded over his head, causing shrapnel wounds to his face, eyes and neck.
Once the IRG had been safely delivered back to the DC, initially it was hoped that it would be possible to recover the stricken callsign ‘32’ by daylight and so 5 and 7 platoons were tasked to piquet the route back to the DC, while 6 platoon continued to provide intimate support, coming under continued contact from a compound some 800 metres to the east. As it became clear that the track would need to be rebuilt before the vehicle could be moved and that the task would take several hours, 7 Platoon moved back to the DC to act as a QRF and 5 Platoon closed in to all round defence. By 0900 hours on the next morning, the Fitter Section had worked another miracle and callsign ‘32’ was ready to be towed. With two Apache in a holding pattern overhead and fast air flying a show of force, callsign ‘21’ threw a track as he was jockeying to move off, causing a further hour’s delay. By lunchtime all were back in the DC, reflecting on an engagement with what appeared to be a more formidable enemy than hitherto encountered.
After a day to rest up and prepare for the move we headed back to Camp Bastion to reflect on our experiences and to give the vehicles some much needed TLC.
PJW 11 Apr 08
[1] At the time of writing Mullah Salam is away in Kabul and further progress is stalled awaiting his return.